Syria’s first parliamentary elections since the fall of the Assad government are taking place within a complex and challenging transitional period. Scheduled for late September 2025, the process has been established by the transitional government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The electoral framework, as defined by Presidential Decree 142, outlines an indirect system that has become a subject of national and international discussion regarding its legitimacy, inclusivity, and implications for Syria’s future.
The current system, which does not involve direct public voting, is described by government officials as a necessary measure given the country’s current state. Factors such as the displacement of millions of Syrians, a lack of updated civil records, and damaged infrastructure are cited as reasons why a traditional, direct election is not feasible at this time. The process is being conducted through a tiered structure where electoral bodies, selected by local subcommittees, will in turn elect parliamentary representatives. The government has stated that the aim of this approach is to select technocrats and academics, with a target of 70% of members falling into this category and 30% being notable community figures.
Incident Chronology
The timeline of the 2025 Syrian parliamentary elections details a process of institutional change and political decision-making.
- December 2024: The Assad government falls, and a transitional government is formed. The former national legislature, the People’s Assembly, is dissolved.
- March 2025: An interim constitution is ratified, establishing a provisional parliament and a five-year transition period.
- June 2, 2025: Presidential Decree 66 is issued, establishing the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections to oversee the new electoral process.
- July 27, 2025: The head of the Higher Committee, Mohammed Taha al-Ahmad, announces a plan to increase the number of parliamentary seats from 150 to 210.
- August 20, 2025: Presidential Decree 142 is enacted, approving a temporary, indirect electoral system. This decree replaces direct public voting with a system of electoral colleges and presidential appointments.
- August 23, 2025: The Syrian government announces that elections will not be held in the provinces of Suwayda, Hasakah, and Raqqa, citing security conditions. The seats allocated to these provinces will be reserved.
- August 26, 2025: The Higher Committee releases the final distribution of seats by governorate, with Aleppo receiving the largest share (32 seats).
- September 7, 2025: Subcommittees across all regions begin the process of selecting members of the electoral bodies (electoral colleges).
- September 11, 2025: The application period for candidates closes.
- September 14, 2025: A member of the Higher Committee’s legal team announces a postponement of the elections due to the high number of applications, stating that the elections are now expected to take place before the end of September.
- September 15-20, 2025 (originally planned date): This period was the initial target for the vote, a deadline that was not met, indicating the logistical and political complexities of the process.
Conflict Dynamics
The electoral process is taking place against a backdrop of complex and ongoing conflict dynamics.
The transitional government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, is the primary actor in the current political process. The government has taken steps to rebuild state institutions and establish a new legislative body. The use of electoral colleges and the president’s ability to appoint one-third of the parliament’s 210 members are specific points of analysis in this regard.
The electoral process has brought into focus the differing political positions of various groups within Syria:
- The Syrian Public and Legislative Legitimacy: The electoral system’s indirect nature means that the general public is not directly involved in the voting process. This lack of direct participation has raised questions about the popular mandate of the new parliament. Additionally, questions regarding the legitimacy of this election, and by extension, legislation it enacts arise, as the lack of direct involvement by the Syrian voters, lack of accurate representation, and sidelining of key stakeholders/demographics will set a foundation that is not truly representative of the Syrian population and its aspirations.
- Druze Community: In the southern province of Suwayda, the Druze community has a history of local autonomy. The decision to postpone elections in the province has been a source of tension. The spiritual leader of the Druze community has publicly stated his view of the Damascus government and has made statements regarding the creation of a separate entity.
- Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration: The AANES in northeastern Syria, which controls Hasakah and Raqqa, has criticized the government’s decision to exclude these regions from the elections. The AANES has described the government’s characterization of its territory as “unsafe” as a justification for a policy of exclusion against the millions of Syrians living there. This highlights the existing territorial and political divisions within the country.
The electoral framework, rather than acting as a tool for immediate national unity, has underscored existing sectarian and regional fault lines. The exclusion of entire provinces and the opaque selection process for electoral colleges may have the potential to exacerbate tensions. The new parliament is anticipated to have a Sunni majority, with a level of representation for minorities that has been a point of discussion. The former People’s Assembly had seats distributed among Sunni Muslims, Alawites, Christians, and Druze, reflecting the country’s demographic proportions.
Ongoing Issues and Governance Challenges
The current electoral process and its context reveal several significant challenges to governance and national cohesion.
The new government’s attempt to centralize authority represents a direct challenge to the various forms of local autonomy that have emerged in different parts of the country since the civil war. In areas like Suwayda and the Kurdish-controlled northeast, the indefinite suspension of elections is viewed as an assertion of central control that does not recognize the existing self-governance models but also act as a sidelining approach of key demographics.
The electoral system, with its reliance on hand-picked committees and presidential appointments, has been viewed by some as a form of centralized control. The small size and vague selection criteria of the subcommittees that form the electoral colleges raise concerns about potential for political influence. The draft law sets quotas for the composition of the electoral colleges, including 20% for women, 3% for people with disabilities, and a 70/30 split between professionals and traditional notables. However, it is unclear if these quotas will be enforced in the final legislative body.
The legitimacy of the new parliament, both domestically and internationally, will be a key issue. The large number of displaced Syrians, both internally and abroad (approximately 7 million to 7.4 million internally displaced and 6.2 million refugees), means that a significant portion of the population will not participate in the electoral process.
Advisory for Development and Humanitarian Agencies
For development and humanitarian agencies, the current political and social landscape in Syria presents a complex operational environment. The following points should be considered:
- Understanding Local Context: The political and security situation varies significantly across governorates. Agencies should maintain a detailed understanding of local power dynamics, community leadership, and security arrangements in each area of operation. The recent elections have highlighted the different governance models in place, from the centralized approach of the transitional government to the de facto autonomy of certain regions.
- Promoting Social Cohesion: The electoral process has underscored existing sectarian and tribal divisions. Agencies should prioritize programs that foster social cohesion and inter-communal dialogue. Initiatives that support local governance bodies and civil society organizations, particularly those that are inclusive of women, youth, and minority groups, can help build a foundation for long-term stability.
- Addressing the Roots of Instability: The ongoing challenges related to displaced populations, economic hardship, and a lack of accountability are significant drivers of instability. Humanitarian and development efforts should go beyond immediate relief to support sustainable solutions, such as livelihood programs, infrastructure rehabilitation, and legal assistance for returning refugees and internally displaced persons.
- Navigating Political Sensitivities: The electoral process, and the government’s efforts to consolidate power, are highly sensitive topics. Agencies should maintain a neutral stance and ensure that their programs are perceived as impartial and beneficial to all communities, without favoring any specific political faction or group. Transparency in funding and operations is critical to building and maintaining trust with local partners and communities.