Yemen Country Risk Brief · 19 November 2026
The War Moves to Aden and Taiz
The Houthi-Saudi exchange has outlasted the largest coalition strike package. Houthi forces are close to Aden and Taiz is under siege. What it means for security, operations and humanitarian access, read across seven risk lenses.
01 Key Takeaways
Yemen’s war at a glance
- The Houthi-Saudi exchange has outlasted the largest announced coalition strike package: the 18 November operation, 60 targets according to coalition spokesman Turki al-Maliki, was followed by four more Houthi ballistic missiles intercepted toward Saudi Arabia’s Southern Region overnight into 19 November.
- SARI Global assesses that the decisive terrain in Yemen is now the Aden approaches and Taiz, not Sanaa: Houthi forces are reported close to Aden (AFP and Reuters differ on the distance), the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) has redeployed from the Red Sea coast and Taiz has been encircled since early October.
- According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), a Famine (IPC Phase 5) outcome in Taiz City is a moderate-likelihood alternative scenario for February to May 2027 if the siege tightens, with 16.0 to 16.99 million people needing food assistance at peak.
- Displacement since the escalation reached 333,000 as of 12 November and more than 340,000 according to IOM on 15 November, with Taiz, Lahj and Aden the main areas of arrival.
- SARI Global judges continued grinding pressure on Aden without a direct assault to be the most likely course over the next 90 days, with a siege of Aden and southern fragmentation the main alternative; a battle for Aden and a limited Saudi-Houthi de-escalation are both less likely.
- SARI Global judges that new detentions of UN and NGO staff in Houthi areas and hospital supply failures in Taiz are baseline conditions, not contingencies, while an Aden airport closure of a week or more is the contingency that matters most for operators.
- SARI Global judges that Saudi Arabia, not Yemen, is the larger near-term variable for client operations, because hub airports can be closed at hours’ notice and a confirmed hit on the Yanbu corridor or on shipping near Bab el-Mandeb would reprice oil faster than the headlines have.
02 Key Judgements
Key judgements on the war around Aden and Taiz
- 1
The exchange outlasted the strike package. Launches and interceptions continue after the largest announced coalition operation. That the exchange continues: high confidence. That the package degraded launch capability: low confidence.
- 2
Aden and Taiz decide the next phase. Houthi forces took the Aden-Taiz road district of al-Maqatirah and moved east along the Gulf of Aden coast, while the last major road into Taiz was captured on 4 October. Moderate confidence.
- 3
Aden is more likely to be pressured than assaulted. Over 30 to 60 days, sustained Houthi pressure east of Lahj and information operations aimed at Aden are more likely than a direct assault. Low to moderate confidence. Houthi forces at the outskirts of Aden would change that.
- 4
Shipping leverage is held in reserve. No confirmed attack on a transiting vessel since the Houthi coastal gains has been found, and Brent fell 20.7 percent between 23 October and 9 November. Oil is pricing the US-Iran track, not Yemen. Moderate confidence.
- 5
Taiz is the humanitarian centre of gravity. The desk’s counter-observation to FEWS NET’s base case is that the siege is already tightening, which points toward the Famine alternative scenario. Moderate confidence.
03 Summary
Summary: the fight has moved from liberating Sanaa to defending Aden
Yemen has had no truce since the 2022 arrangement lapsed, and the United Nations envoy told the Security Council on 9 October that the country was back in full-scale war. The fight is now over Aden and Taiz. Houthi forces are close to Aden, the government has pulled back from the Red Sea coast, Taiz has been besieged since early October, and the 18 November coalition operation, which the coalition said hit 60 targets in Sanaa, Hodeidah, Amran and Saada, did not stop Houthi launches at Saudi Arabia.
For humanitarian agencies and companies, the near-term risk is concentrated in three places: Aden, where one airport and three road entries carry the south; Taiz, where supplies and hospitals are failing under siege; and Saudi Arabia, whose hub airports can be closed at hours’ notice. Red Sea shipping and regional escalation are held in reserve rather than active, and would change the picture quickly if they were released.
This brief reads the situation across SARI’s seven risk lenses: security, political and governance, legislative and regulatory, economic and financial, sanctions, trade and logistics, sector and business, and social and public order. It closes with two cross-lens chains, a forecast table, six scenarios to mid-February 2027, and the thresholds that would change SARI’s assessment.
04 Indicators
Indicators: what the counted data show
| Indicator | Reading | Date | Grade | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coalition strike package | 60 targets: Sanaa, Hodeidah, Amran, Saada | 18 Nov | A | Escalating |
| Missiles intercepted, Saudi Southern Region | 4 ballistic overnight | 18-19 Nov | B | Continuing |
| Houthi distance from Aden | Close; wire reports differ on the distance | 16-17 Nov | B | Closing |
| Houthi-held coastline | 150+ km, Dhubab to near Khor Amira | 16 Nov | B/C | Expanding |
| Last major Taiz road to PLC areas | Captured | 4 Oct | B | Siege in place |
| Killed and injured since the August escalation | 12,779, of whom 2,260 killed (reporting 58 to 92 percent complete) | Mid-Nov | B | Rising |
| Displaced since 1 August | 347,321 to 14 Nov, including 18,780 in the week of 8 to 14 Nov; Taiz and Lahj the main hosts | Oct-Nov | A | Rising |
| UN and NGO staff detained by Houthi authorities | At least 73 UN staff plus dozens of NGO and civil society staff | Aug | A/B | Unchanged to rising |
| Vehicle entries to Taiz | Fewer than 150 a day, down from 8,000 to 10,000 before 4 Oct | Nov | B/C | Down |
| People needing food assistance | 16.0 to 16.99 million at peak | Oct | B | Elevated to May 2027 |
| Brent | 116.72 USD (23 Oct close) to 92.57 USD (9 Nov close), down 20.7% | Oct-Nov | B | Falling; no official settle since 9 Nov |
05 Security
Security: launches continue as the front moves south
Observation. The coalition reported interceptions toward Saudi territory on 18 and 19 November after announcing a package of 60 targets. On the ground Houthi forces took the Aden-Taiz road district of al-Maqatirah and moved east along the Gulf of Aden coast, and the PLC’s Southern Armed Forces announced a repositioning from Dhubab airport and the Bab el-Mandeb area on 15 November. Taiz has been encircled since early October.
Actor reads. The Houthis want an end to the Saudi blockade and control of the coast, and are constrained by interception rates and resupply. Saudi Arabia wants its airports, energy sites and capital protected, and is constrained by interceptor stocks and a reluctance to commit ground forces. The PLC wants to hold Aden but is stretched and defensive. The United States has stayed out of strikes on Houthi positions.
Two readings of the 18 November package. The obvious reading is that Riyadh is degrading launch capability in the north rather than reinforcing the south; the alternative is a signalling package timed to the 16 November Saudi command change. SARI favours the first at low to moderate confidence, because the targets were missile tunnels and drone workshops, not front-line units. Continued launches within 48 hours weaken it.
The defence of Aden. The governorate covers about 750 square kilometres in eight districts with three road entries: Al-Rubat to the north, Al-Alam to the east and Ras Imran to the west. The government is fortifying and redeploying toward Lahj, but analysts describe a lack of unified command as its main weakness. Houthi sources say they do not intend to attack Aden, which SARI treats as a claim.
06 Political, legislative and sanctions
Political and sanctions: positions are hardening
Where the talks stand
No truce has been in force since 2022. The Houthi leadership’s public terms are an end to Saudi naval and air restrictions, reopened airports and harbours, return of national resources and reparations. Riyadh’s stated line is that Yemen will not become a base for threats to its security. The terms do not overlap: the Houthis ask for the blockade to end first, Saudi Arabia asks for the launches to end first. No channel, Omani or Iranian, carries a Yemen clause, and Iran told mediators in late October that it lacks leverage over the Houthis.
Legislative and sanctions
The Security Council voted unanimously on 12 November to extend the Yemen sanctions regime and the Panel of Experts, condemning Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and exempting humanitarian supplies (Al Jazeera/Reuters, grade B). Saudi Arabia is pressing the European Union for a Houthi terrorist designation (Reuters, grade B). Nothing material was found for either authority’s domestic legislation; silence is not stability.
Government changes and international pressure
The Yemeni parliament passed a law on 18 November designating the Houthis a terrorist group, with one article removing immunity for members in any future settlement. On 3 November the government reshuffled three ministries, including information, local administration and the civil service. The foreign minister urged the European Union on 12 November to list the Houthis as a terrorist organisation, and the G7 foreign ministers condemned Houthi attacks, called for a humanitarian corridor to Taiz and asked for the release of detained aid workers. These moves harden positions and narrow the room for a quick settlement.
07 Economic, trade and sector
Economy: oil prices Iran, not Yemen
Oil and the Red Sea. Yemen matters to energy markets through Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu outlet, which became the main export route when Hormuz was disrupted. Brent closed at 116.72 dollars on 23 October and at 92.57 dollars on 9 November, down 20.7 percent as Yemen escalated, so oil is pricing the US-Iran track, not Yemen. The risk is asymmetric: a confirmed hit on Yanbu or on shipping near Bab el-Mandeb would reprice faster than the headlines have.
Trade and finance. The currency split persists, at roughly 1,560 rials to the dollar in government areas and 531 to 534 in Houthi areas. Fuel imports fell by about two thirds in August against July, wheat and flour imports by 48 percent, and risk surcharges added about 3,000 dollars per container earlier in the year. Aden’s electricity gap runs at about 400 MW at peak, and Houthi authorities have revoked the licences of more than 4,000 commercial agencies.
Aviation. King Khalid airport in Riyadh reopened on 18 October after a notice lapse, and the US Embassy issued a nationwide alert on 14 November. The planning assumption is that Saudi hub access can be withdrawn at hours’ notice.
09 Reading across the lenses
Reading across the lenses: two chains to watch
Chain A: coast, Saudi exposure and oil
Observation. The Houthis hold the offshore islands and, according to the BBC citing mapping by ISW and AEI’s Critical Threats Project on 15 November, much of the coast; SARI treats mainland control at Dhubab and Mokha as unconfirmed independently. Launches at Saudi territory continue, yet Brent fell 20.7 percent. Inference. The Houthis are holding shipping leverage in reserve while pressing Saudi land targets, and oil is pricing Iran, not Yemen.
Chain B: Aden pressure, PLC cohesion and the southern question
Observation. Houthi forces are close to Aden, the PLC has redeployed from the coast, Saudi Arabia changed its joint-forces command on 16 November and southern factions are positioning over who holds authority in Aden. AQAP shows no claimed attack in 2026. Inference. Houthi pressure raises the incentive for southern factions to fight for Aden on their own terms and weakens PLC authority over them; a weaker PLC also widens southern operating space for AQAP.
Chain A is already partly live; Chain B is the likelier next shift in client risk.
10 Forecast
Forecast: what to expect at 30, 90 and 180 days
SARI judgements of likelihood for three horizons, rated from very low to very high, with a confidence rating for each line. They are not mutually exclusive and assume no change in the US-Iran track.
| Event | 30 days | 90 days | 180 days | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Houthi launches at Saudi territory continue | Very high | Very high | High | High |
| A formal truce or announced halt in force | Very low | Low | Low to moderate | Moderate |
| Houthi forces hold ground inside Aden governorate | Low | Low to moderate | Low to moderate | Low to moderate |
| Sustained urban fighting in Aden | Very low | Low | Low to moderate | Low |
| Aden airport closed for 7 days or more | Low | Low to moderate | Low to moderate | Low to moderate |
| A named successor to the dissolved STC claims authority | Low | Low to moderate | Low to moderate | Low |
| Hospital fuel, oxygen or medicine failure at several major hospitals in Taiz | Moderate to high | High | Moderate to high | Moderate |
| Formal Famine (IPC Phase 5) classification for Taiz City | Very low | Low | Low | Low |
| New reported detentions of UN, NGO or embassy-linked staff by Houthi authorities | High | Very high | Very high | Moderate to high |
| Strike on Hodeidah, Ras Isa or Saleef port infrastructure | Low | Low to moderate | Moderate | Low to moderate |
| UKMTO-confirmed attack on a merchant vessel | Low | Low to moderate | Low to moderate | Low |
| US strike on Houthi positions | Very low | Low | Low to moderate | Low |
What drives the forecast
Aden is a siege and politics problem before it is an assault problem. Houthi forces have reached al-Maqatirah and the coast near Khor Omeir, and the government has pulled back from Dhubab and Bab el-Mandeb to the Aden depth. Defenders are a fragmented coalition without a single command, which is their main weakness, while open terrain and air cover favour them. Encirclement and pressure on southern politics are cheaper for the Houthis than urban assault, so the likelihood of urban fighting is very low at 30 days while the 180-day rating is materially higher.
The Saudi exchange outlasts any single package. Both sides have shown they can sustain it, and the terms do not overlap: the Houthis want the blockade lifted first, Riyadh wants the launches to stop first. Parliament’s 18 November law designating the Houthis a terrorist group removes some of the government’s room to bargain.
Taiz runs on its own clock. Vehicle entries fell by more than 98 percent after 4 October and local authorities report supplies down by about 90 percent, so hospital failures persist whether or not the front moves.
11 Scenarios
Six scenarios to mid-February 2027
Six scenarios describe the dominant state of the conflict over 90 days, to mid-February 2027. They are not ranked precisely: the first is the base case and the second the main alternative, and real conditions will blend them.
1. Grinding pressure on Aden, no assault
Houthi forces consolidate the coast and press Lahj and the Aden-Taiz road. The government holds the three entries to Aden (Al-Rubat, Al-Alam, Ras Imran) and fortifies. The Saudi exchange continues at its plateau, Taiz stays besieged, and information operations against Aden intensify.
2. Siege of Aden and southern fragmentation
Houthi forces threaten two of three entries and strike the airport and port intermittently. Southern formations refuse unified command and a body claiming to succeed the dissolved STC issues decisions. Houthi pressure becomes a political lever on southern leaders.
3. Battle for Aden
Fighting reaches Sheikh Othman, Dar Saad or the northern approaches, with coalition air power concentrated on the approaches, mass civilian departures and the port and airport shut.
4. Limited Saudi-Houthi de-escalation
A quiet channel produces a halt in cross-border launches and coalition packages without ending ground fighting around Taiz and Lahj. Corridors for Taiz become negotiable, but detention and financial constraints in Houthi areas persist.
5. Regional widening
The US-Iran track breaks down, or a US or Israeli strike on Houthi positions draws attacks on shipping or Gulf infrastructure. Hodeidah, Ras Isa, Saleef, Sanaa airport and fuel and power sites become targets. Houthi-held ports handle about 70 percent of commercial imports and about 80 percent of humanitarian cargo, so supply gaps follow within weeks.
6. Government collapse and southern break
The PLC splits, parts of the south declare separate authority, and Saudi Arabia must choose among factions. AQAP and local armed groups widen their space in Abyan, Shabwa and Hadramawt.
The US-Iran track is the main modifier: resumed war raises scenarios 2, 3 and 5 together. A Saudi decision to commit ground forces is not assumed in any scenario and would change the assessment.
12 Implications
What it means for humanitarian actors and companies
For humanitarian agencies. The binding constraints are detention risk in Houthi-held areas (at least 73 UN staff were still held in 2026), the closure of Taiz, and the dependence of Houthi-held areas on three ports and one airport that sit on the target lists of any regional widening. Aden is the other single point of failure: its airport is the main way in and out, so the scenarios that matter most for agencies are the siege of Aden and regional widening. Severity is rising even in the baseline, with about 51 percent of people in government-held areas projected in IPC Phase 3 or above for October to December.
For companies. The Red Sea exposure is latent, not realised, and one confirmed vessel attack with attribution would reprice shipping and insurance at once. Saudi hub airports can be closed at hours’ notice. Oil is currently pricing Iran, not Yemen, so a confirmed disruption of Yanbu loadings would move prices faster than the headlines suggest. In the south, the combination of a power gap of about 400 MW in Aden, a currency split between roughly 1,560 and 531 to 534 rials to the dollar, and contested central bank directives raises cost and settlement risk before any front-line change.
13 Outlook and watch list
Outlook and thresholds that would change the assessment
Over the next 30 days the most likely path is continued launches and interceptions at the current plateau, Houthi pressure east of Lahj and around Taiz without a direct assault on Aden, further coalition packages and no ceasefire. Less likely but material: a Houthi push into Aden’s outskirts, a named southern body claiming authority, or a confirmed vessel or Yanbu incident.
| Indicator | Threshold that changes the assessment | Direction |
|---|---|---|
| Launches at Saudi territory | 14 consecutive days without an announced launch | De-escalation |
| Houthi distance from Aden | Fighting at the city’s outskirts | Battle for Aden |
| Named successor to the dissolved STC | Claims authority and issues decisions | Southern break |
| Confirmed vessel attack near Bab el-Mandeb | One UKMTO-confirmed hit with attribution | Leverage realised |
| Yanbu loadings or the East-West pipeline | Confirmed disruption attributed to the Houthis | Oil repricing |
| US action | A strike on Houthi positions | Regional war |
| Taiz road access | A reopened supply route, or a famine classification | Humanitarian turn |
14 Limits
Known gaps and limits
Several points could not be confirmed independently: control at Dhubab, Mokha and the islands; port-level throughput at Hodeidah, Ras Isa, Saleef, Aden and Mukalla; the number of UN staff detained after August; an up-to-date funding total; and the cause and casualties of the 13 November explosion in Aden. Forecast ratings are SARI judgements and are not derived from a statistical model.
15 FAQ
Frequently asked questions
What is happening in Yemen in November 2026?
Fighting resumed in 2026 and no truce is in force. Houthi forces are reported close to Aden, the PLC has redeployed from the Red Sea coast, Taiz has been encircled since early October, and the Houthi-Saudi exchange of strikes and missile launches continues after the coalition’s 18 November package of 60 targets.
How close are Houthi forces to Aden?
Close. AFP and Reuters gave different distances on 16 and 17 November, and SARI treats the front as within reach of the city’s approaches. SARI has set Houthi forces at the outskirts of Aden, or fighting at the city’s outskirts, as the threshold for a battle for Aden.
Is there a risk of famine in Taiz?
FEWS NET rates a Famine (IPC Phase 5) outcome in Taiz City as a moderate-likelihood alternative scenario for February to May 2027 if the siege tightens. SARI’s own observation, that the last major supply road was cut on 4 October, points toward that alternative, at moderate confidence.
Will the Houthi conflict affect Red Sea shipping?
Not yet, according to SARI’s assessment. No confirmed attack on a transiting vessel since the Houthi coastal gains has been found, and the Houthi line is that navigation is safe except for Saudi Arabia. SARI assesses the leverage as latent and sets one UKMTO-confirmed hit with attribution as the threshold that would make it realised.
Why does Saudi Arabia matter for client operations in Yemen?
Saudi hub airports and land crossings are the main access routes for many clients. King Khalid airport in Riyadh reopened on 18 October after a notice lapse, the US Embassy issued a nationwide alert on 14 November, and SARI advises planning on the assumption that access can be withdrawn at hours’ notice.
What scenarios does SARI see for Yemen to February 2027?
SARI plans against six scenarios to mid-February 2027: grinding pressure on Aden without assault (the base case), a siege of Aden with southern fragmentation (the main alternative), a battle for Aden, limited Saudi-Houthi de-escalation, regional widening including a Red Sea shipping campaign, and government collapse with a southern break.
Is it safe to operate in Aden in November 2026?
Aden is open but is a restricted environment. Houthi missiles struck Bureiqa district on 11 November, Houthi forces are reported close to the city, and the airport is the single point of failure for staff movement. SARI treats Houthi forces at the outskirts of Aden, a strike on the airport with casualties, or loss of the Aden-Mukalla road as the thresholds that would change that assessment.
How likely is a new detention of UN or NGO staff in Yemen?
SARI assesses a new reported detention of UN, NGO or embassy-linked staff by Houthi authorities as moderate to high over 30 days and very high over 90 days. At least 73 UN staff were still detained in 2026 and further raids on UN premises in Sanaa have been reported, so detention is a baseline risk for agencies.
This brief draws on SARI Global proprietary data, supplemented by secondary HUMINT and OSINT sources, to 19 November 2026. Party self-reports are not counted as confirmed.
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SARI Global (2026). The War Moves to Aden and Taiz: Yemen Country Risk Brief. 19 November 2026. https://sari.global/yemen-country-risk-brief-19-november-2026/
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About SARI Global
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Every assessment is triangulated across primary sources, secondary reporting and on-the-ground insight before it reaches a client. All engagements integrate conflict sensitivity, safeguarding and human rights principles, and are handled in confidence.
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08 Social and public order
Humanitarian picture: Taiz is the centre of gravity
Taiz is the humanitarian centre of gravity. FEWS NET’s October outlook places Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in Hajjah, Hodeidah and Taiz and rates Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Taiz City a moderate-likelihood alternative scenario for February to May 2027 if the siege tightens. Its base case assumes the siege does not become prolonged. The desk’s counter-observation is that the last major supply road was cut on 4 October and Houthi forces have since taken al-Maqatirah and the Kharaz base, which points toward the alternative. Moderate confidence.
Scale and depth. Local authorities report that vehicle entries to Taiz fell from 8,000 to 10,000 a day to no more than 150, with supplies down by about 90 percent and food prices up by about 60 percent. About 800,000 people have disrupted access, over 600,000 of them in Taiz governorate. Nutrition screening in Taiz City found 4,771 acute malnutrition cases among 14,933 children (32 percent), a screening yield, not a prevalence survey. The 2026 appeal of 2.16 billion dollars is about one fifth funded, and at least 73 UN staff were still detained by Houthi authorities in 2026.
Operating picture. Access is constrained from three directions at once: detention risk for national and international staff in Houthi areas, a besieged Taiz, and an appeal about one fifth funded. SARI does not expect any of the three to ease within 30 days.