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Houthis Edge Closer to Aden – Yemen Country Risk Brief

Yemen Country Risk Brief: The War Moves to Aden and Taiz | SARI Global

Yemen Country Risk Brief · 19 November 2026

The War Moves to Aden and Taiz

Yemen Country Risk Brief: security, politics, economy and humanitarian outlook

The Houthi-Saudi exchange has outlasted the largest coalition strike package. Houthi forces are close to Aden and Taiz is under siege. What it means for security, operations and humanitarian access, read across seven risk lenses.

SARI Global AnalysisSeven-lens country briefForecast and scenarios
SanaaSaadaHodeidahTaizAdenMokhaMaribMukallaBab el-MandebJizan (Saudi)Najran (Saudi)SAUDI ARABIAOMANRED SEAGULF OF ADENYEMENN
Key locations in Yemen. Dashed rings mark the approximate range of reported Houthi advance toward Aden on 16 and 17 November. Locations indicative; basemap Natural Earth.
CloseHouthi forces to Aden, as reported on 16 and 17 November
2,260killed and 10,519 injured since the August escalation, with reporting incomplete
347,000displaced since 1 August, to 14 November
16.0m+people needing food assistance at peak, in the October outlook
Source: SARI Global proprietary data, supplemented by secondary HUMINT and OSINT sources

01 Key Takeaways

Yemen’s war at a glance

  • The Houthi-Saudi exchange has outlasted the largest announced coalition strike package: the 18 November operation, 60 targets according to coalition spokesman Turki al-Maliki, was followed by four more Houthi ballistic missiles intercepted toward Saudi Arabia’s Southern Region overnight into 19 November.
  • SARI Global assesses that the decisive terrain in Yemen is now the Aden approaches and Taiz, not Sanaa: Houthi forces are reported close to Aden (AFP and Reuters differ on the distance), the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) has redeployed from the Red Sea coast and Taiz has been encircled since early October.
  • According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), a Famine (IPC Phase 5) outcome in Taiz City is a moderate-likelihood alternative scenario for February to May 2027 if the siege tightens, with 16.0 to 16.99 million people needing food assistance at peak.
  • Displacement since the escalation reached 333,000 as of 12 November and more than 340,000 according to IOM on 15 November, with Taiz, Lahj and Aden the main areas of arrival.
  • SARI Global judges continued grinding pressure on Aden without a direct assault to be the most likely course over the next 90 days, with a siege of Aden and southern fragmentation the main alternative; a battle for Aden and a limited Saudi-Houthi de-escalation are both less likely.
  • SARI Global judges that new detentions of UN and NGO staff in Houthi areas and hospital supply failures in Taiz are baseline conditions, not contingencies, while an Aden airport closure of a week or more is the contingency that matters most for operators.
  • SARI Global judges that Saudi Arabia, not Yemen, is the larger near-term variable for client operations, because hub airports can be closed at hours’ notice and a confirmed hit on the Yanbu corridor or on shipping near Bab el-Mandeb would reprice oil faster than the headlines have.

02 Key Judgements

Key judgements on the war around Aden and Taiz

  1. 1
    The exchange outlasted the strike package. Launches and interceptions continue after the largest announced coalition operation. That the exchange continues: high confidence. That the package degraded launch capability: low confidence.
  2. 2
    Aden and Taiz decide the next phase. Houthi forces took the Aden-Taiz road district of al-Maqatirah and moved east along the Gulf of Aden coast, while the last major road into Taiz was captured on 4 October. Moderate confidence.
  3. 3
    Aden is more likely to be pressured than assaulted. Over 30 to 60 days, sustained Houthi pressure east of Lahj and information operations aimed at Aden are more likely than a direct assault. Low to moderate confidence. Houthi forces at the outskirts of Aden would change that.
  4. 4
    Shipping leverage is held in reserve. No confirmed attack on a transiting vessel since the Houthi coastal gains has been found, and Brent fell 20.7 percent between 23 October and 9 November. Oil is pricing the US-Iran track, not Yemen. Moderate confidence.
  5. 5
    Taiz is the humanitarian centre of gravity. The desk’s counter-observation to FEWS NET’s base case is that the siege is already tightening, which points toward the Famine alternative scenario. Moderate confidence.

03 Summary

Summary: the fight has moved from liberating Sanaa to defending Aden

Yemen has had no truce since the 2022 arrangement lapsed, and the United Nations envoy told the Security Council on 9 October that the country was back in full-scale war. The fight is now over Aden and Taiz. Houthi forces are close to Aden, the government has pulled back from the Red Sea coast, Taiz has been besieged since early October, and the 18 November coalition operation, which the coalition said hit 60 targets in Sanaa, Hodeidah, Amran and Saada, did not stop Houthi launches at Saudi Arabia.

For humanitarian agencies and companies, the near-term risk is concentrated in three places: Aden, where one airport and three road entries carry the south; Taiz, where supplies and hospitals are failing under siege; and Saudi Arabia, whose hub airports can be closed at hours’ notice. Red Sea shipping and regional escalation are held in reserve rather than active, and would change the picture quickly if they were released.

This brief reads the situation across SARI’s seven risk lenses: security, political and governance, legislative and regulatory, economic and financial, sanctions, trade and logistics, sector and business, and social and public order. It closes with two cross-lens chains, a forecast table, six scenarios to mid-February 2027, and the thresholds that would change SARI’s assessment.

04 Indicators

Indicators: what the counted data show

Counted indicators, Yemen, to 19 November 2026
Indicator Reading Date Grade Direction
Coalition strike package 60 targets: Sanaa, Hodeidah, Amran, Saada 18 Nov A Escalating
Missiles intercepted, Saudi Southern Region 4 ballistic overnight 18-19 Nov B Continuing
Houthi distance from Aden Close; wire reports differ on the distance 16-17 Nov B Closing
Houthi-held coastline 150+ km, Dhubab to near Khor Amira 16 Nov B/C Expanding
Last major Taiz road to PLC areas Captured 4 Oct B Siege in place
Killed and injured since the August escalation 12,779, of whom 2,260 killed (reporting 58 to 92 percent complete) Mid-Nov B Rising
Displaced since 1 August 347,321 to 14 Nov, including 18,780 in the week of 8 to 14 Nov; Taiz and Lahj the main hosts Oct-Nov A Rising
UN and NGO staff detained by Houthi authorities At least 73 UN staff plus dozens of NGO and civil society staff Aug A/B Unchanged to rising
Vehicle entries to Taiz Fewer than 150 a day, down from 8,000 to 10,000 before 4 Oct Nov B/C Down
People needing food assistance 16.0 to 16.99 million at peak Oct B Elevated to May 2027
Brent 116.72 USD (23 Oct close) to 92.57 USD (9 Nov close), down 20.7% Oct-Nov B Falling; no official settle since 9 Nov
Parties’ own claims are not counted in these indicators.

05 Security

Security: launches continue as the front moves south

Observation. The coalition reported interceptions toward Saudi territory on 18 and 19 November after announcing a package of 60 targets. On the ground Houthi forces took the Aden-Taiz road district of al-Maqatirah and moved east along the Gulf of Aden coast, and the PLC’s Southern Armed Forces announced a repositioning from Dhubab airport and the Bab el-Mandeb area on 15 November. Taiz has been encircled since early October.

Actor reads. The Houthis want an end to the Saudi blockade and control of the coast, and are constrained by interception rates and resupply. Saudi Arabia wants its airports, energy sites and capital protected, and is constrained by interceptor stocks and a reluctance to commit ground forces. The PLC wants to hold Aden but is stretched and defensive. The United States has stayed out of strikes on Houthi positions.

Two readings of the 18 November package. The obvious reading is that Riyadh is degrading launch capability in the north rather than reinforcing the south; the alternative is a signalling package timed to the 16 November Saudi command change. SARI favours the first at low to moderate confidence, because the targets were missile tunnels and drone workshops, not front-line units. Continued launches within 48 hours weaken it.

The defence of Aden. The governorate covers about 750 square kilometres in eight districts with three road entries: Al-Rubat to the north, Al-Alam to the east and Ras Imran to the west. The government is fortifying and redeploying toward Lahj, but analysts describe a lack of unified command as its main weakness. Houthi sources say they do not intend to attack Aden, which SARI treats as a claim.

06 Political, legislative and sanctions

Political and sanctions: positions are hardening

Where the talks stand

No truce has been in force since 2022. The Houthi leadership’s public terms are an end to Saudi naval and air restrictions, reopened airports and harbours, return of national resources and reparations. Riyadh’s stated line is that Yemen will not become a base for threats to its security. The terms do not overlap: the Houthis ask for the blockade to end first, Saudi Arabia asks for the launches to end first. No channel, Omani or Iranian, carries a Yemen clause, and Iran told mediators in late October that it lacks leverage over the Houthis.

Legislative and sanctions

The Security Council voted unanimously on 12 November to extend the Yemen sanctions regime and the Panel of Experts, condemning Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and exempting humanitarian supplies (Al Jazeera/Reuters, grade B). Saudi Arabia is pressing the European Union for a Houthi terrorist designation (Reuters, grade B). Nothing material was found for either authority’s domestic legislation; silence is not stability.

Government changes and international pressure

The Yemeni parliament passed a law on 18 November designating the Houthis a terrorist group, with one article removing immunity for members in any future settlement. On 3 November the government reshuffled three ministries, including information, local administration and the civil service. The foreign minister urged the European Union on 12 November to list the Houthis as a terrorist organisation, and the G7 foreign ministers condemned Houthi attacks, called for a humanitarian corridor to Taiz and asked for the release of detained aid workers. These moves harden positions and narrow the room for a quick settlement.

07 Economic, trade and sector

Economy: oil prices Iran, not Yemen

Oil and the Red Sea. Yemen matters to energy markets through Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu outlet, which became the main export route when Hormuz was disrupted. Brent closed at 116.72 dollars on 23 October and at 92.57 dollars on 9 November, down 20.7 percent as Yemen escalated, so oil is pricing the US-Iran track, not Yemen. The risk is asymmetric: a confirmed hit on Yanbu or on shipping near Bab el-Mandeb would reprice faster than the headlines have.

Trade and finance. The currency split persists, at roughly 1,560 rials to the dollar in government areas and 531 to 534 in Houthi areas. Fuel imports fell by about two thirds in August against July, wheat and flour imports by 48 percent, and risk surcharges added about 3,000 dollars per container earlier in the year. Aden’s electricity gap runs at about 400 MW at peak, and Houthi authorities have revoked the licences of more than 4,000 commercial agencies.

Aviation. King Khalid airport in Riyadh reopened on 18 October after a notice lapse, and the US Embassy issued a nationwide alert on 14 November. The planning assumption is that Saudi hub access can be withdrawn at hours’ notice.

08 Social and public order

Humanitarian picture: Taiz is the centre of gravity

Taiz is the humanitarian centre of gravity. FEWS NET’s October outlook places Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in Hajjah, Hodeidah and Taiz and rates Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Taiz City a moderate-likelihood alternative scenario for February to May 2027 if the siege tightens. Its base case assumes the siege does not become prolonged. The desk’s counter-observation is that the last major supply road was cut on 4 October and Houthi forces have since taken al-Maqatirah and the Kharaz base, which points toward the alternative. Moderate confidence.

Displaced by governorate, IOM-DTM count at 27 October 2026
Displaced people by governorate, 27 October 2026Bar chart. Taiz 128,484, Lahj 71,100 and Aden 53,016 displaced people out of 287,767 in the IOM-DTM count.Taiz128,484Lahj71,100Aden53,016
Count at 27 October 2026, total 287,767; later estimates reached 333,000 on 12 November and more than 340,000 on 15 November, so the 27 October count is a lower bound.

Scale and depth. Local authorities report that vehicle entries to Taiz fell from 8,000 to 10,000 a day to no more than 150, with supplies down by about 90 percent and food prices up by about 60 percent. About 800,000 people have disrupted access, over 600,000 of them in Taiz governorate. Nutrition screening in Taiz City found 4,771 acute malnutrition cases among 14,933 children (32 percent), a screening yield, not a prevalence survey. The 2026 appeal of 2.16 billion dollars is about one fifth funded, and at least 73 UN staff were still detained by Houthi authorities in 2026.

Operating picture. Access is constrained from three directions at once: detention risk for national and international staff in Houthi areas, a besieged Taiz, and an appeal about one fifth funded. SARI does not expect any of the three to ease within 30 days.

09 Reading across the lenses

Reading across the lenses: two chains to watch

Chain A: coast, Saudi exposure and oil

Observation. The Houthis hold the offshore islands and, according to the BBC citing mapping by ISW and AEI’s Critical Threats Project on 15 November, much of the coast; SARI treats mainland control at Dhubab and Mokha as unconfirmed independently. Launches at Saudi territory continue, yet Brent fell 20.7 percent. Inference. The Houthis are holding shipping leverage in reserve while pressing Saudi land targets, and oil is pricing Iran, not Yemen.

AssessmentLeverage stays latent unless Saudi Arabia escalates beyond air strikes or Aden falls. It flips to realised leverage on a confirmed vessel attack near Bab el-Mandeb or a confirmed Yanbu disruption attributed to the Houthis.

Chain B: Aden pressure, PLC cohesion and the southern question

Observation. Houthi forces are close to Aden, the PLC has redeployed from the coast, Saudi Arabia changed its joint-forces command on 16 November and southern factions are positioning over who holds authority in Aden. AQAP shows no claimed attack in 2026. Inference. Houthi pressure raises the incentive for southern factions to fight for Aden on their own terms and weakens PLC authority over them; a weaker PLC also widens southern operating space for AQAP.

AssessmentSustained pressure east of Lahj and information operations aimed at Aden are more likely than a direct assault. It flips toward a southern break if a named successor to the dissolved STC claims authority, and toward a battle for Aden if Houthi forces reach the city’s outskirts.

Chain A is already partly live; Chain B is the likelier next shift in client risk.

10 Forecast

Forecast: what to expect at 30, 90 and 180 days

SARI judgements of likelihood for three horizons, rated from very low to very high, with a confidence rating for each line. They are not mutually exclusive and assume no change in the US-Iran track.

SARI forecast, Yemen, from 19 November 2026
Event 30 days 90 days 180 days Confidence
Houthi launches at Saudi territory continue Very high Very high High High
A formal truce or announced halt in force Very low Low Low to moderate Moderate
Houthi forces hold ground inside Aden governorate Low Low to moderate Low to moderate Low to moderate
Sustained urban fighting in Aden Very low Low Low to moderate Low
Aden airport closed for 7 days or more Low Low to moderate Low to moderate Low to moderate
A named successor to the dissolved STC claims authority Low Low to moderate Low to moderate Low
Hospital fuel, oxygen or medicine failure at several major hospitals in Taiz Moderate to high High Moderate to high Moderate
Formal Famine (IPC Phase 5) classification for Taiz City Very low Low Low Low
New reported detentions of UN, NGO or embassy-linked staff by Houthi authorities High Very high Very high Moderate to high
Strike on Hodeidah, Ras Isa or Saleef port infrastructure Low Low to moderate Moderate Low to moderate
UKMTO-confirmed attack on a merchant vessel Low Low to moderate Low to moderate Low
US strike on Houthi positions Very low Low Low to moderate Low

What drives the forecast

Aden is a siege and politics problem before it is an assault problem. Houthi forces have reached al-Maqatirah and the coast near Khor Omeir, and the government has pulled back from Dhubab and Bab el-Mandeb to the Aden depth. Defenders are a fragmented coalition without a single command, which is their main weakness, while open terrain and air cover favour them. Encirclement and pressure on southern politics are cheaper for the Houthis than urban assault, so the likelihood of urban fighting is very low at 30 days while the 180-day rating is materially higher.

The Saudi exchange outlasts any single package. Both sides have shown they can sustain it, and the terms do not overlap: the Houthis want the blockade lifted first, Riyadh wants the launches to stop first. Parliament’s 18 November law designating the Houthis a terrorist group removes some of the government’s room to bargain.

Taiz runs on its own clock. Vehicle entries fell by more than 98 percent after 4 October and local authorities report supplies down by about 90 percent, so hospital failures persist whether or not the front moves.

11 Scenarios

Six scenarios to mid-February 2027

Six scenarios describe the dominant state of the conflict over 90 days, to mid-February 2027. They are not ranked precisely: the first is the base case and the second the main alternative, and real conditions will blend them.

1. Grinding pressure on Aden, no assault

Houthi forces consolidate the coast and press Lahj and the Aden-Taiz road. The government holds the three entries to Aden (Al-Rubat, Al-Alam, Ras Imran) and fortifies. The Saudi exchange continues at its plateau, Taiz stays besieged, and information operations against Aden intensify.

Early signsHouthi advances stall east of Lahj; no gains at the Rubat axis; coalition packages repeat every one to two weeks.
For operationsAden stays open but restricted. The airport and the three road entries remain the single points of failure for staff movement, and Taiz access stays closed.

2. Siege of Aden and southern fragmentation

Houthi forces threaten two of three entries and strike the airport and port intermittently. Southern formations refuse unified command and a body claiming to succeed the dissolved STC issues decisions. Houthi pressure becomes a political lever on southern leaders.

Early signsHouthi forces at the city outskirts; a successor body names officials; PLC leadership change; Aden airport shut 48 hours or more.
For operationsIntermittent airport and port disruption in Aden. Plan for air movement to be withdrawn at short notice and for fuel and power shortfalls to deepen.

3. Battle for Aden

Fighting reaches Sheikh Othman, Dar Saad or the northern approaches, with coalition air power concentrated on the approaches, mass civilian departures and the port and airport shut.

Early signsFighting at the Rubat or Ras Imran entries; shelling of Sheikh Othman; embassy and UN drawdown notices.
For operationsAden port and airport shut and civilians leaving. Drawdown and evacuation planning for Aden would be triggered and humanitarian access to the south narrows sharply.

4. Limited Saudi-Houthi de-escalation

A quiet channel produces a halt in cross-border launches and coalition packages without ending ground fighting around Taiz and Lahj. Corridors for Taiz become negotiable, but detention and financial constraints in Houthi areas persist.

Early signsFourteen days without announced launches; public reference to talks; a reopened Taiz road.
For operationsCorridors to Taiz become negotiable and Saudi hub access steadier, but detention risk and financial constraints in Houthi areas remain.

5. Regional widening

The US-Iran track breaks down, or a US or Israeli strike on Houthi positions draws attacks on shipping or Gulf infrastructure. Hodeidah, Ras Isa, Saleef, Sanaa airport and fuel and power sites become targets. Houthi-held ports handle about 70 percent of commercial imports and about 80 percent of humanitarian cargo, so supply gaps follow within weeks.

Early signsA US or Israeli strike; a confirmed vessel hit; a Yanbu disruption attributed to the Houthis.
For operationsHouthi-held ports and Sanaa airport come under threat, so supply gaps follow within weeks, and shipping and insurance costs reprice at once.

6. Government collapse and southern break

The PLC splits, parts of the south declare separate authority, and Saudi Arabia must choose among factions. AQAP and local armed groups widen their space in Abyan, Shabwa and Hadramawt.

Early signsPLC leadership change; a southern formation claims Aden institutions; contested central bank directives.
For operationsAuthority over Aden institutions and central bank directives is contested, which raises settlement and counterparty risk and widens space for AQAP in the south.

The US-Iran track is the main modifier: resumed war raises scenarios 2, 3 and 5 together. A Saudi decision to commit ground forces is not assumed in any scenario and would change the assessment.

12 Implications

What it means for humanitarian actors and companies

For humanitarian agencies. The binding constraints are detention risk in Houthi-held areas (at least 73 UN staff were still held in 2026), the closure of Taiz, and the dependence of Houthi-held areas on three ports and one airport that sit on the target lists of any regional widening. Aden is the other single point of failure: its airport is the main way in and out, so the scenarios that matter most for agencies are the siege of Aden and regional widening. Severity is rising even in the baseline, with about 51 percent of people in government-held areas projected in IPC Phase 3 or above for October to December.

For companies. The Red Sea exposure is latent, not realised, and one confirmed vessel attack with attribution would reprice shipping and insurance at once. Saudi hub airports can be closed at hours’ notice. Oil is currently pricing Iran, not Yemen, so a confirmed disruption of Yanbu loadings would move prices faster than the headlines suggest. In the south, the combination of a power gap of about 400 MW in Aden, a currency split between roughly 1,560 and 531 to 534 rials to the dollar, and contested central bank directives raises cost and settlement risk before any front-line change.

13 Outlook and watch list

Outlook and thresholds that would change the assessment

Over the next 30 days the most likely path is continued launches and interceptions at the current plateau, Houthi pressure east of Lahj and around Taiz without a direct assault on Aden, further coalition packages and no ceasefire. Less likely but material: a Houthi push into Aden’s outskirts, a named southern body claiming authority, or a confirmed vessel or Yanbu incident.

Indicators to watch on Yemen, with thresholds that change the assessment
Indicator Threshold that changes the assessment Direction
Launches at Saudi territory 14 consecutive days without an announced launch De-escalation
Houthi distance from Aden Fighting at the city’s outskirts Battle for Aden
Named successor to the dissolved STC Claims authority and issues decisions Southern break
Confirmed vessel attack near Bab el-Mandeb One UKMTO-confirmed hit with attribution Leverage realised
Yanbu loadings or the East-West pipeline Confirmed disruption attributed to the Houthis Oil repricing
US action A strike on Houthi positions Regional war
Taiz road access A reopened supply route, or a famine classification Humanitarian turn

14 Limits

Known gaps and limits

Several points could not be confirmed independently: control at Dhubab, Mokha and the islands; port-level throughput at Hodeidah, Ras Isa, Saleef, Aden and Mukalla; the number of UN staff detained after August; an up-to-date funding total; and the cause and casualties of the 13 November explosion in Aden. Forecast ratings are SARI judgements and are not derived from a statistical model.

15 FAQ

Frequently asked questions

What is happening in Yemen in November 2026?

Fighting resumed in 2026 and no truce is in force. Houthi forces are reported close to Aden, the PLC has redeployed from the Red Sea coast, Taiz has been encircled since early October, and the Houthi-Saudi exchange of strikes and missile launches continues after the coalition’s 18 November package of 60 targets.

How close are Houthi forces to Aden?

Close. AFP and Reuters gave different distances on 16 and 17 November, and SARI treats the front as within reach of the city’s approaches. SARI has set Houthi forces at the outskirts of Aden, or fighting at the city’s outskirts, as the threshold for a battle for Aden.

Is there a risk of famine in Taiz?

FEWS NET rates a Famine (IPC Phase 5) outcome in Taiz City as a moderate-likelihood alternative scenario for February to May 2027 if the siege tightens. SARI’s own observation, that the last major supply road was cut on 4 October, points toward that alternative, at moderate confidence.

Will the Houthi conflict affect Red Sea shipping?

Not yet, according to SARI’s assessment. No confirmed attack on a transiting vessel since the Houthi coastal gains has been found, and the Houthi line is that navigation is safe except for Saudi Arabia. SARI assesses the leverage as latent and sets one UKMTO-confirmed hit with attribution as the threshold that would make it realised.

Why does Saudi Arabia matter for client operations in Yemen?

Saudi hub airports and land crossings are the main access routes for many clients. King Khalid airport in Riyadh reopened on 18 October after a notice lapse, the US Embassy issued a nationwide alert on 14 November, and SARI advises planning on the assumption that access can be withdrawn at hours’ notice.

What scenarios does SARI see for Yemen to February 2027?

SARI plans against six scenarios to mid-February 2027: grinding pressure on Aden without assault (the base case), a siege of Aden with southern fragmentation (the main alternative), a battle for Aden, limited Saudi-Houthi de-escalation, regional widening including a Red Sea shipping campaign, and government collapse with a southern break.

Is it safe to operate in Aden in November 2026?

Aden is open but is a restricted environment. Houthi missiles struck Bureiqa district on 11 November, Houthi forces are reported close to the city, and the airport is the single point of failure for staff movement. SARI treats Houthi forces at the outskirts of Aden, a strike on the airport with casualties, or loss of the Aden-Mukalla road as the thresholds that would change that assessment.

How likely is a new detention of UN or NGO staff in Yemen?

SARI assesses a new reported detention of UN, NGO or embassy-linked staff by Houthi authorities as moderate to high over 30 days and very high over 90 days. At least 73 UN staff were still detained in 2026 and further raids on UN premises in Sanaa have been reported, so detention is a baseline risk for agencies.

This brief draws on SARI Global proprietary data, supplemented by secondary HUMINT and OSINT sources, to 19 November 2026. Party self-reports are not counted as confirmed.

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Cite This Report

SARI Global (2026). The War Moves to Aden and Taiz: Yemen Country Risk Brief. 19 November 2026. https://sari.global/yemen-country-risk-brief-19-november-2026/

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About SARI Global

SARI Global is a privately owned risk intelligence firm founded in Beirut in 2024 by practitioners from the humanitarian, military and private sectors. We operate a 24/7 operations centre, in-country teams in five full coverage countries and the STRAT-i intelligence platform.

Every assessment is triangulated across primary sources, secondary reporting and on-the-ground insight before it reaches a client. All engagements integrate conflict sensitivity, safeguarding and human rights principles, and are handled in confidence.

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